Sushko P.E. Russians’ Ideas About Russia’s Possible Development Paths: Prevalence and Specificity. Social Sciences. 2023. Vol. 54. No. 1. Pp. 4-17. Sushko P.E. Russians’ Ideas About Russia’s Possible Development Paths: Prevalence and Specificity. Social Sciences. 2023. Vol. 54. No. 1. Pp. 4-17.ISSN 0134-5486DOI: 10.21557/SSC.84506105EDN: KOHVTOРИНЦ: https://elibrary.ru/contents.asp?id=59719534Размещена на сайте: 27.04.23 Поискать полный текст на Google AcademiaСсылка при цитировании:Sushko P.E. Russians’ Ideas About Russia’s Possible Development Paths: Prevalence and Specificity. Social Sciences. 2023. Vol. 54. No. 1. Pp. 4-17. DOI: 10.21557/SSC.84506105. EDN: KOHVTO.Sushko P.E. Russians’ Ideas About Russia’s Possible Development Paths: Prevalence and Specificity. Social Sciences. 2023. Vol. 54. No. 1. Pp. 4-17. DOI: 10.21557/SSC.84506105.Авторы:Сушко П.Е.АннотацияThis article analyzes the worldview of Russians regarding the priority development vector of Russian society against the backdrop of the Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine. A nationwide represen- tative study carried out by the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (FCTAS RAS) in March 2022 (N = 2000) revealed two qualitatively different positions. The majority (54%) is convinced that Russia’s development vec- tor should be unique and distinctive from the Western model. The minority (19%) wants closer relations with the Western countries and, accordingly, to look to their example. Not only do these two groups differ with respect to their social and demographic features and values profile, but they also hold different assessments of the decision to launch the SMO in Ukraine and can- not agree in their assessments of its key actors. They are not, however, 100% antipodes: they agree that responsibility for the conflict in Ukraine should be distributed among different countries; they are not ready to accept restrictions that might significantly worsen their social and economic status; and they are not ready to transform their displeasure into public protest. The final civiliza- tional choice belongs to the “significant Other” pattern.Ключевые слова:worldview of Russians national identity public conscience Russia’s future civilizational choice Рубрики: Социология общественного мненияСоциальная структура и стратификацияВозможно, вам будут интересны другие публикации:Сушко П. Е.Отношение к Западу российских граждан и их представления о друзьях и врагах РФ // Российское общество и вызовы времени. Книга шестая / ФНИСЦ РАН, Институт социологии. Под ред. М.К. Горшкова и Н.Е. Тихоновой. Москва: Издательство «Весь Мир», 2022. С. 202-227.Fabrykant M., Magun V. Grounded and Normative Dimensions of National Pride in Comparative Perspective // Dynamics of National Identity: Media and Societal Factors of What We Are // Ed. by P. Schmidt, J. Grimm, L. Huddy, J. Seethaler. L.: Routledge, 2016. Ch. 6. P. 83-112.Fabrykant, M. and Magun, V. 2019. Dynamics of National Pride: Attitudes in Post-Soviet Russia, 1996–2015. Nationalities Papers 47: 20–37, doi:10.1017/nps.2018.18Mareeva S.V. Middle Class: System of Values and Perceptions on Country’s Development Vector // Journal of Economic Sociology (Latvia). 2015. Vol. 3. No. 1. P. 39-54.Ангарская И. В., Позднякова М. Е.Ценностный потенциал классического гуманизма для новых стратегий формирования человеческого достоинства // Философия образования. 2024. Т. 24, № 1. С. 71–86.